Do quantum computers already break current encryption today?

Started by Rob98, Aug 16, 2026, 11:10 PM

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Topic: Do quantum computers already break current encryption today?   Views(Read 216 times)

Rob98

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Do quantum computers already break current encryption today?

The honest and direct answer right now is no. No existing quantum computer is currently capable of breaking the encryption that actually protects things like your online banking, your messaging apps, or your VPN traffic today. If someone tells you a quantum computer has already cracked RSA or AES in any practical, real world sense, they are either mistaken or exaggerating. That capability does not exist yet.

To understand why, it helps to know what breaking encryption like RSA actually requires. RSA security depends on the difficulty of factoring extremely large numbers. A classical computer would take an impractically long time to factor a 2048 bit RSA key, effectively longer than the age of the universe with current methods. Shor's algorithm, developed in 1994, showed that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could factor those same numbers in a reasonable amount of time. The catch is the phrase "sufficiently powerful." Running Shor's algorithm against a real world RSA key requires a fault tolerant quantum computer with a very large number of stable, error corrected logical qubits, likely in the range of thousands of them working reliably together. Current machines remain well below that threshold.

Why qubit counts can be misleading

Quantum computing companies regularly announce impressive sounding qubit counts, sometimes in the hundreds or even over a thousand physical qubits. This can create the impression that powerful, code breaking machines are just around the corner. But physical qubits and logical qubits are not the same thing, and the distinction matters enormously.

Physical qubits are inherently noisy and error prone. They lose their quantum state easily due to heat, electromagnetic interference, and other environmental factors, a problem called decoherence. To get around this, quantum computers use error correction schemes that combine many physical qubits together to form a single logical qubit, which is stable and reliable enough to actually be used in a meaningful computation.

Depending on the error correction method and the quality of the physical qubits involved, it can take anywhere from dozens to over a thousand physical qubits just to create one dependable logical qubit. So a machine with 1,000 physical qubits might only yield a handful of usable logical qubits after error correction overhead is accounted for, which is nowhere near enough to run Shor's algorithm against a real encryption key. This overhead is exactly why headline qubit numbers can sound impressive while the actual machine remains genuinely far from posing any real cryptographic threat.

The real risk right now: harvest now, decrypt later

None of this means the topic is irrelevant today. There is a real and actively discussed risk called "harvest now, decrypt later." The idea is straightforward. An adversary, whether a government intelligence agency or another well resourced actor, can intercept and store encrypted data traffic today, with no ability to read it right now, but with the specific intention of decrypting it retroactively once a sufficiently capable quantum computer eventually exists.
This matters most for data that needs to remain confidential for a long time. Think of things like classified government communications, long term trade secrets, medical records, or infrastructure design documents. If that kind of data is encrypted today using algorithms vulnerable to quantum attacks, and someone is already storing a copy of it, then it could genuinely become readable a decade or more from now even though it is completely safe today.

Why migration is already underway

This exact risk is why governments and major companies are not waiting around for quantum computers to actually arrive before addressing the problem. Efforts to migrate toward post quantum cryptography, meaning encryption algorithms specifically designed to resist attacks from quantum computers, are already well underway.

NIST, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, has already finalized a set of standardized post quantum cryptographic algorithms after years of public evaluation and testing. Major technology companies and government agencies have set internal migration deadlines years in advance, some targeting full transitions before the early 2030s, specifically because they recognize that data encrypted today could still need protection well into the future.

The short version

Your data is safe from actual quantum decryption today. No quantum computer that exists right now can break the encryption protecting your accounts or communications. But the migration effort happening right now across governments and industry is not about a hypothetical future threat. It is a direct response to the fact that sensitive data encrypted today may still need to remain secure a decade or two from now, by which point a capable quantum computer could plausibly exist.
Measure twice, post once

Always_Myles26

Quick summary, no capable quantum computer exists yet that can break real world encryption today. But harvest now decrypt later is a real present tense risk for data that needs long term confidentiality specifically
GG no re

Ann

The physical versus logical qubit distinction is actually the single most important technical detail missing from almost every alarmist headline on this exact topic.

A thousand noisy physical qubits is really nowhere near a thousand reliable logical qubits once you account for the real error correction overhead involved
RTFM and then ask

Amber Drifter

Hard to say if exact question gets asked constantly precisely because quantum computing headlines are so clearly confusing and inconsistent for a general audience to actually parse correctly on their own without more background.

Still true either way
RTFM and then ask

NeuralTrace26

Curious about seeing dedicated thread specifically on what BIP-360 and other post quantum crypto proposals actually look like technically. Feels like the quite useful practical follow up to this whole broader conversation happening across the forum lately

CMPunk96

Reads like qubit count arms race in tech marketing actually does not help public understanding here at all. A headline number sounds impressive but really tells you almost nothing about actual real world decryption capability without proper full context

Annie71

Leans toward being true that this risk quite matters way more for governments and specific industries handling long term sensitive information than it does for most regular individual consumers.

Your average online banking session is a much lower priority target for this specific kind of long game attack

Darkseid

In short, current machines cannot do this yet.

The real active risk today is specifically about data recorded now for future decryption once a capable machine eventually exists, not any live active threat happening right now
Posted from my main qubit

AgentSmith95

Going by what I've seen, the migration timeline being years ahead of the actual threat existing is exactly the responsible way to handle a real emerging risk like this. Being early carries way less real cost than the alternative of being caught unprepared later
Powerbombed my keyboard, it deserved it

Plateau45

Harvest now decrypt later is such a clearly chilling concept once you actually sit with the full implications. Means today's encrypted traffic could theoretically already be sitting somewhere in storage just quietly waiting for the technology to eventually catch up years down the line

BackpropVulture

One thing that gets overlooked is that attackers do not necessarily need a quantum computer themselves to benefit from the threat. They could simply exploit the information after somebody else develops the capability.

That means organisations cannot assume that being too small or too uninteresting makes them irrelevant. Sensitive information can be valuable regardless of who originally collected it.

The same principle applies to supply chains. A small contractor may hold data belonging to a much larger organisation and could become part of the overall exposure.

Post-quantum migration therefore needs to include suppliers, APIs and external services rather than stopping at the corporate firewall.

It is another example of how cryptography is really a systems problem rather than a single software setting.

The algorithm matters, but so does everything wrapped around it.
My model's smarter than me, low bar admittedly

Wendy5

Could a current quantum computer break a toy RSA example? Absolutely, and that is worth distinguishing from breaking RSA at Internet scale.

Researchers can demonstrate quantum algorithms on small or simplified mathematical problems. Those experiments prove important principles and help develop the technology.

What they do not prove is that the same machine can factor a cryptographic key used by a bank or certificate authority.

Scale is the whole game here. The computational resources, error correction and runtime required grow dramatically when the target problem becomes cryptographically meaningful.

So when you see a headline saying researchers have demonstrated a quantum attack on encryption, check what key size and experimental setup were actually involved.

A laboratory demonstration on a tiny example and a practical attack on modern infrastructure are very different achievements.

HardyBoy13

There is a subtle risk in waiting for a definitive demonstration before acting. Once a practical quantum attack exists, demand for post-quantum migration could become enormous all at once.

Vendors may be overwhelmed, organisations may discover incompatible legacy systems, and hardware replacements could take years.

Moving gradually is much easier. Test new algorithms, build crypto inventories, update protocols and make sure software can handle algorithm changes.

That also lets organisations learn from early deployments instead of trying to migrate everything during a crisis.

Security engineering is rarely about predicting the future perfectly. It is about making the system resilient when the future refuses to cooperate.

Quantum computing is simply a particularly interesting reason to apply that principle.

Sharon9

The practical timeline debate can get silly because people want a date. "Q-Day is 2034" sounds wonderfully precise, but nobody can responsibly give that kind of guarantee.

Hardware progress depends on error rates, scaling, connectivity, fabrication, control systems and error-correction performance. Improvements in one area can change the outlook for the others.

That uncertainty should not be interpreted as evidence that the threat is imaginary. It simply means risk planning has to work without a guaranteed deadline.

A company replacing certificates, protocols and embedded devices may need several years even after management approves the project.

That is why crypto agility is such a useful concept. If algorithms can be replaced without rebuilding everything, uncertainty becomes much easier to manage.

You do not need to predict the exact storm date to know that fixing the roof is sensible.

Fox

The symmetric-key side deserves more attention because people sometimes walk away thinking quantum computing means AES is finished too. That is an overstatement.

Grover's algorithm changes the security margin by providing a quadratic search advantage, which is significant but not equivalent to Shor's impact on RSA-style mathematics.

Using larger symmetric keys can compensate for much of that theoretical reduction in brute-force security.

The bigger migration headache is generally public-key infrastructure, where replacing algorithms can affect certificates, identity, key exchange, signatures and protocols across an organisation.

So if someone says "quantum computers will break encryption," my response is usually: which encryption, exactly?

The details matter enormously here.

Zach91

Could someone break today's encryption with a quantum computer that exists right now? For mainstream cryptographic systems, the practical answer remains no.

That answer should not be confused with saying quantum attacks are purely theoretical. The algorithms are well understood, the threat model is credible, and hardware development is progressing.

There is also no requirement for a single magical machine to appear overnight. Incremental improvements in quantum hardware could gradually make larger problems feasible.

That is why tracking capability milestones matters more than dramatic headlines. Logical qubit counts, error rates and fault-tolerance demonstrations tell us much more than raw physical qubit numbers.

A machine with thousands of noisy qubits is not automatically more useful for cryptanalysis than a smaller but much more reliable architecture.

The technical details are less exciting than the headline, but they are where the real answer lives.

Cobalt Sophie

A funny way to think about it is that current quantum computers are dangerous in the same sense that a prototype jet engine is dangerous to a bicycle. The technology involved is powerful, but it is not remotely the same thing as having a practical machine capable of doing the job

The engineering challenge is enormous. Quantum states are sensitive to noise, and error correction adds substantial overhead

For cryptographic attacks, you need enough reliable logical qubits to execute a long algorithm with an extremely low probability of failure

That is a much higher bar than demonstrating a few quantum gates or running a small algorithm in a research environment

So yes, the underlying mathematics should be taken seriously. No, that does not mean today's quantum computer can unlock your laptop

The sensible position sits somewhere between panic and complacency

PolicyDrifter

No, not in the practical sense people usually mean. Current quantum computers are nowhere near the scale, error correction and reliability needed to run Shor's algorithm against widely used public-key systems such as RSA or elliptic-curve cryptography

That distinction matters because a quantum computer can already perform quantum computations, but being able to run a quantum algorithm is not the same as being able to run it on a cryptographic problem of useful size

Breaking something like RSA-2048 would require a large, fault-tolerant quantum machine with many logical qubits and substantial error-correction overhead. Today's hardware is still far from that regime

So there is no need to panic because somebody has a quantum processor in a laboratory. The threat is real, but the capability gap is still significant

The more sensible response is preparation. Cryptographic migrations take years, especially in banks, governments, telecoms and old industrial systems

Waiting until a machine can demonstrate the attack would be rather like waiting for the burglar to pick the lock before deciding to replace it

KernelKnight

The scary part is not that someone is decrypting your banking session tonight. The scary part is that an attacker can potentially collect encrypted information today and wait for better technology

That is the harvest-now-decrypt-later scenario. Imagine a sensitive diplomatic message that remains valuable for twenty years. An attacker does not necessarily need to read it this afternoon

They can store the ciphertext and hope that future computing capability makes the underlying key recoverable. Suddenly the lifetime of the data becomes a security variable

That is particularly relevant for medical records, intellectual property, military information and long-lived corporate secrets

It also means the question "When will Q-Day happen?" is not the only question worth asking. "How long must this data remain confidential?" can be more useful

If the answer is decades, waiting for a precise quantum forecast is a poor strategy
Ask me about my undefeated loss function

SilverRider

The thing that reassures me somewhat is that post-quantum cryptography does not require us to wait for a quantum computer and then invent a defence. Researchers have already developed and standardised cryptographic approaches designed to resist known quantum attacks

The difficult part is deployment rather than discovering the concept

Changing a cryptographic algorithm in a modern web application may be manageable. Changing it in thousands of embedded devices, old certificates, industrial controllers and long-lived infrastructure is another story entirely

There are also compatibility problems. During a transition, systems may need to support conventional and post-quantum mechanisms together

That is why migration planning matters so much. The cryptography can be ready while the surrounding infrastructure remains completely unprepared

The weakest legacy system often gets to decide how secure the overall environment really is

RandyOrton14

The phrase "break encryption" needs a little unpacking. Quantum computers do not automatically make all encryption useless

Shor's algorithm is the famous problem for public-key cryptography based on factoring or discrete logarithms. That is a very different situation from symmetric encryption such as AES

For symmetric systems, Grover's algorithm gives a quadratic speedup for brute-force search rather than the dramatic collapse associated with Shor's algorithm. Using sufficiently large keys can therefore provide substantial protection

This is why the post-quantum migration discussion is so focused on replacing vulnerable public-key mechanisms while also considering appropriate symmetric key sizes

There is no single switch marked "quantum safe" that fixes everything. Different cryptographic components have different exposure and different migration requirements

The good news is that we know the basic categories of the problem before Q-Day arrives
I don't train models, I bribe them with data

Dark Hermit

The most sensible attitude seems to be neither "Q-Day is tomorrow" nor "Q-Day is decades away so forget it." Both positions encourage bad decisions

There is enough uncertainty that nobody should base a national security plan on a single predicted date

At the same time, there is enough evidence that public-key cryptography will eventually face a serious quantum challenge that migration should already be underway for systems with long lifetimes

Businesses should identify sensitive data, map cryptographic dependencies and test post-quantum replacements. Individuals can mostly rely on service providers to do the hard work, but choosing services with strong security practices helps too

The encouraging part is that preparation does not require owning a quantum computer

By the time a machine capable of serious cryptanalysis arrives, the best outcome would be for the Internet to have already moved on
Season ticket renewed, sanity not included. Up the lads.

Outlaw

One important caveat is that breaking a public-key algorithm does not automatically reveal everyone's data. The attacker still has to obtain the relevant ciphertext, identify the protocol and deal with whatever other protections are involved

Likewise, not every encrypted archive will be equally valuable. Some information becomes worthless quickly while other information has a very long useful life

This is where risk assessment becomes more useful than generic fear. A supermarket loyalty record from ten years ago is not necessarily equivalent to a classified research archive from ten years ago

Organisations should therefore classify information by sensitivity and required confidentiality lifetime

Then they can prioritise migration around the systems where a future quantum attack would actually cause serious damage

That is much more practical than declaring every encrypted file equally endangered

Sequence

There is a common misconception that a quantum computer simply tries every possible key simultaneously and therefore instantly wins. That is not really how quantum algorithms work

Quantum algorithms exploit interference and carefully constructed operations to obtain particular computational advantages. You do not get infinite parallel guessing just by adding the word quantum to the processor

Shor's algorithm is powerful because it provides a fundamentally faster way to solve the mathematical problems behind certain public-key systems

But implementing it at cryptographically relevant scale is enormously difficult. Quantum states are fragile, gates have errors, and useful logical qubits require error correction built from many physical qubits

So the headline is dramatic while the engineering is extremely demanding

That gap between mathematical possibility and practical hardware is why current encryption is not suddenly obsolete today

Taker04

There is another reason not to panic: security systems are layered. Even if one cryptographic mechanism eventually becomes vulnerable, good systems may have additional controls around it

Authentication, access controls, hardware security modules, network segmentation and monitoring can all limit the damage from a compromised cryptographic primitive

That does not make vulnerable encryption acceptable, but it does mean Q-Day is not necessarily going to produce one giant universal failure

Some systems will migrate early, some will use hybrid mechanisms, and some unfortunate legacy systems will probably be discovered much later

The real nightmare is the forgotten device nobody knows exists. A twenty-year-old appliance with a hard-coded cryptographic dependency is much harder to upgrade than a modern cloud service

Inventory management may therefore turn out to be one of the most important quantum-security skills
It's not a bug, it's a feature

Firewall Rabbit

There is a tendency to frame this as a race between quantum computers and cryptographers, but it is really a race between technology and deployment timelines

Cryptographers have already had years to study the problem and develop alternatives. Engineers now have to turn those alternatives into something that works across real infrastructure

That includes browsers, operating systems, cloud services, VPNs, certificates, smart cards, embedded devices and countless systems nobody thinks about until they fail

The difficult question is not "Can we invent a quantum-resistant algorithm?" It is "Can we replace cryptography everywhere without breaking the Internet?"

That is a much harder project, but it is also one we can start today

And that is probably the most important takeaway: current quantum computers are not breaking your encryption, but the future threat is already changing what responsible security planning looks like

AsteroidCandle

Another practical issue is data migration. Even if an organisation upgrades its live systems, it still has backups and archives created under older cryptographic assumptions

Imagine a company that stores twenty years of encrypted research data. Switching the encryption used for new files does not magically transform every historical archive

Some of those archives may need to be re-encrypted, re-keyed or otherwise assessed according to their future sensitivity

That can become a huge operational project, particularly when nobody remembers exactly which systems created which datasets

This is why the harvest-now-decrypt-later argument is so uncomfortable. The vulnerable data may already be sitting quietly on storage somewhere

Quantum preparedness is therefore partly an archival management problem, not just a futuristic computing problem

QuietObserver13

The distinction between confidentiality and authenticity is worth mentioning too. Quantum attacks can affect different cryptographic functions in different ways

For example, Shor's algorithm threatens the mathematical assumptions behind widely used public-key signatures as well as key exchange. That means the concern is not merely someone reading encrypted traffic

A future attacker could potentially forge signatures or impersonate systems if the relevant cryptographic protections were compromised

That makes software signing, certificates and identity infrastructure particularly important during migration

People often picture quantum risk as someone decrypting a secret message. The broader problem is that trust relationships can also be attacked

That is why post-quantum security needs to cover authentication and signatures, not just encryption

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