NIST finalises its post-quantum plan, deprecating RSA and ECC after 2030

Started by Echo36, Oct 29, 2026, 11:48 PM

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Topic: NIST finalises its post-quantum plan, deprecating RSA and ECC after 2030   Views(Read 103 times)

Echo36

The timeline for moving away from today's encryption has just got firmer. PostQuantum reports that NIST has published the final version of its report on the transition to post-quantum cryptography standards, known as NIST IR 8547, and withdrawn the earlier 2024 draft

The biggest change is stricter dates. The draft would have kept stronger classical algorithms such as P-256, RSA-3072 and Ed25519 acceptable until 2035. The final version deprecates RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA signatures at every approved strength after 2030, and the same goes for classical key establishment methods such as Diffie-Hellman and RSA. All of them become disallowed after 2035

In NIST's language, deprecated means you can still use something but must accept and assess the risk yourself, while disallowed means it is no longer permitted. The report is aligned with recent US federal deadlines, including moving high value systems to post-quantum key establishment by the end of 2030 and post-quantum signatures by the end of 2031

There are other updates too. HQC is confirmed as an alternative key encapsulation method, with ML-KEM-768 recommended as the default, TLS is named as an early priority, and the lightweight Ascon cipher is added. Hybrid key establishment remains allowed as long as one part uses an approved method such as ML-KEM. NIST's Dustin Moody said there is not one strategy that fits all use cases, and the agency received 25 formal comments, including from Bosch, Ericsson, Intel and Thales

This matters well beyond the US government, because NIST's guidance shapes what vendors and other countries do. Bringing the deadline forward to 2030 for most uses gives organisations less time than many expected. Anyone who has not started a cryptography inventory should start now

Is a 2030 deadline realistic for most organisations? And how far along is your workplace with post-quantum planning?


Cobra69

Keeping hybrid key exchange allowed is sensible. Most real deployments use hybrids today. Cloudflare and Google have been doing it for a while

Forcing pure post-quantum too early would add risk. Hybrids also protect against unknown flaws in the new algorithms

NWO

Twenty five formal comments from firms like Ericsson and Thales shows how much industry cares. Telecom kit has long lifecycles. They needed clarity

Clear deadlines help suppliers plan products. Ambiguity is expensive. Industry asked for certainty and got it
I read every reply. Even the bad ones.

Undertaker_EU

Bringing 2035 forward to 2030 for deprecation is a big shift. Many companies assumed they had another decade

Budgets will need to change quickly. Finance teams rarely plan this far ahead

Gaz_60

Old embedded devices are the nightmare here. Industrial controllers and medical kit can run for twenty years. Many cannot be upgraded at all, and replacing them by 2030 will be hugely expensive. Hospitals are a particular worry here

Voyager43

Signatures are harder to migrate than key exchange. Certificates, firmware signing and code signing all have to change. That is where the real work will be

The 2031 deadline for signatures reflects that difficulty. Code signing alone touches every product