Defence milestones a timeline of the world preparing for Q-Day

Started by Freddie_85, Today at 10:55 AM

Previous topic - Next topic

Freddie_85 and 2 Guests are viewing this topic.

Topic: Defence milestones a timeline of the world preparing for Q-Day   Views(Read 28 times)
Active members in this topic:
Freddie_85(1)

Freddie_85

TL;DR

  • The world began preparing for Q-Day almost as soon as Shor's algorithm appeared in 1994, long before any quantum computer could threaten cryptography
  • NIST's open competition ran from 2016 to 2024 and produced FIPS 203, 204 and 205 on 13 August 2024, with HQC selected as a backup in March 2025
  • Deployment followed quickly: browsers, OpenSSH, OpenSSL, Signal, Apple, Cloudflare and GitHub all shipped post quantum key exchange between 2023 and 2025
  • 2026 brought hard dates: Google and Cloudflare targets of 2029, US Executive Order 14412 with 2030 and 2031 deadlines, and NIST's final IR 8547
  • Next up: FN-DSA (FIPS 206), the HQC standard, CNSA 2.0 acquisition rules from January 2027 and post quantum web certificates in 2027

Why a defence timeline matters

Most quantum timelines track the offence: how many qubits, which error rates, when a machine might break RSA. That story matters, but it is only half the picture. The other half is how cryptographers, standards bodies, governments and companies have prepared, and that story is remarkably encouraging. Few security threats in history have been met with this much advance planning

This thread collects the major defence milestones in one chronological list, with dates and sources. It is designed to be quoted, linked and extended. If a reader asks whether the world is ready for Q-Day, this timeline is a good place to show what has already been done. Please add missing milestones in the replies, especially from regions underrepresented here

Foundations: 1994 to 2015

In 1994, Peter Shor published his quantum algorithm for factoring and discrete logarithms, showing that a large quantum computer could break RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve cryptography. Two years later, Lov Grover published his search algorithm, which showed symmetric cryptography would need only larger keys. Together they defined the shape of the threat for the next three decades. Everything that follows traces back to those two papers

Research into quantum resistant cryptography grew steadily through the following decade. Several of the mathematical families now standardised, including lattices, codes and hash based signatures, have roots going back to the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In 2006 the first PQCrypto conference was held, giving the field a dedicated academic home. That community did the patient groundwork that made later standards possible

In August 2015, the US National Security Agency announced that it planned to transition to quantum resistant algorithms. The announcement surprised many observers and signalled that a major intelligence agency considered the threat serious enough to act. It helped trigger the standards process that followed. In hindsight, 2015 marks the moment post quantum cryptography moved from academic topic to policy priority

Other bodies were active too. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute set up a quantum safe cryptography working group in 2015, and several European agencies began publishing guidance on quantum risk in the years that followed. Academic groups across Europe, North America and Asia contributed many of the candidate algorithms. The defence effort was international from the start

The NIST competition: 2016 to 2022

In December 2016, NIST issued a formal call for post quantum public key algorithms. By the deadline in November 2017, it had received 82 submissions, and 69 were accepted into the first round in December 2017. Teams from around the world took part, and the whole process ran in public. That openness became one of its greatest strengths

The field narrowed over successive rounds, with 26 candidates in the second round announced in January 2019 and 15 in the third round announced in July 2020. Public analysis was intense, and it worked. In February 2022, Ward Beullens published an attack that broke the Rainbow signature scheme, a third round finalist, using a laptop over a weekend. The process caught a weak candidate before it was standardised, exactly as intended

On 5 July 2022, NIST announced its first selections: CRYSTALS-Kyber for key establishment and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON and SPHINCS+ for signatures. Four further key establishment candidates moved to a fourth round. Weeks later, Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru published a classical attack that broke SIKE, one of those fourth round candidates, in about an hour on a single core for its smallest parameters. Again the scrutiny worked, and SIKE was withdrawn

Policy moved in parallel. In May 2022, the White House issued National Security Memorandum 10, setting a goal of mitigating quantum risk as far as feasible by 2035. In September 2022, the NSA published CNSA 2.0, its quantum resistant algorithm suite for national security systems. In December 2022, the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act became law in the US, directing federal agencies to prepare for migration

Industry experiments began early as well. Google tested a post quantum key exchange called CECPQ1 in Chrome in 2016, and Google and Cloudflare ran a larger experiment called CECPQ2 in 2019. These trials revealed practical issues with message sizes and middleboxes years before the final standards. Lessons from them shaped the smooth deployments of 2023 and 2024

From drafts to deployment: 2023 to 2024

In August 2023, NIST published draft standards for ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, the standardised forms of Kyber, Dilithium and SPHINCS+. The same month, CISA, the NSA and NIST released a joint fact sheet urging organisations to begin quantum readiness planning, including building cryptographic inventories. Google Chrome began rolling out a hybrid key exchange combining X25519 with Kyber around the same time. The transition was moving from documents into products

Messaging providers moved early. In September 2023, Signal announced its PQXDH protocol, adding post quantum protection to the initial key agreement for new chats. In February 2024, Apple announced PQ3 for iMessage, which it described as reaching a new level of messaging security with post quantum protection for both initial keys and ongoing rekeying. Billions of users gained protection against harvest now, decrypt later attacks without changing anything themselves

On 13 August 2024, NIST published the final standards: FIPS 203 for ML-KEM, FIPS 204 for ML-DSA and FIPS 205 for SLH-DSA. This was the defining milestone of the whole effort. In November 2024, Chrome switched its hybrid key exchange from the draft Kyber to the standard ML-KEM, and NIST released its draft IR 8547 proposing deprecation of quantum vulnerable algorithms after 2030 and disallowance after 2035. In December 2024, Google's Willow chip showed below threshold error correction, a reminder that the offence was progressing too

Momentum builds: 2025

On 11 March 2025, NIST selected HQC, a code based key encapsulation mechanism, as a backup to ML-KEM, providing diversity in case lattice problems ever weaken. On 20 March 2025, the UK NCSC published its migration timelines, with milestones of 2028, 2031 and 2035. In April 2025, OpenSSH 10.0 made hybrid ML-KEM key exchange its default, and OpenSSL 3.5 added ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA. Infrastructure that underpins much of the internet now supported the new standards out of the box

In May 2025, Craig Gidney published his estimate that RSA-2048 could be factored with fewer than one million noisy qubits in under a week. In June 2025, the EU's NIS Cooperation Group published its coordinated implementation roadmap, and Canada published its government migration roadmap. In August 2025, Microsoft set out a plan for early adoption by 2029 and full transition by 2033. In September 2025, GitHub added a hybrid post quantum key exchange for SSH access

Late 2025 brought important plumbing. In October 2025, the IETF published RFC 9881, defining how ML-DSA appears in X.509 certificates. OpenSSH 10.1 began warning users when connections did not use post quantum key exchange. In December 2025, Japan's National Cyber Command Office set 2035 as the target for government agencies, aligning Japan with other allies

Meanwhile, the offence kept producing reminders. Hardware companies published dated fault tolerance roadmaps, and new resource estimates kept lowering the bar for attacks. Each estimate reinforced the case for migration rather than causing panic. The defence community has learned to treat these papers as planning inputs

Hard dates arrive: 2026

On 25 March 2026, Google announced a 2029 target for migrating its own systems, with emphasis on signatures and authentication. Days later, Google researchers and collaborators posted an estimate that 256 bit elliptic curve cryptography could be broken with roughly 1,200 to 1,450 logical qubits, or fewer than half a million physical qubits on suitable hardware. In April 2026, Cloudflare announced its own 2029 goal for full post quantum security. These moves signalled that leading engineers saw less margin than many had assumed

Enterprise and web infrastructure kept moving. On 13 May 2026, Microsoft made ML-DSA generally available in Active Directory Certificate Services on Windows Server 2025. On 3 June 2026, Let's Encrypt announced plans for post quantum Merkle Tree Certificates, aiming for production readiness in 2027. Chrome had already set out a plan for a quantum resistant root store built on Merkle Tree Certificates, targeted for the third quarter of 2027

On 22 June 2026, the White House issued Executive Order 14412, requiring post quantum key establishment on federal high value and high impact systems by 31 December 2030 and signatures by 31 December 2031, with contractors also expected to meet post quantum FIPS requirements by the end of 2030. A companion order, EO 14413, addressed quantum innovation. In late October 2026, NIST published the final IR 8547, confirming deprecation after 2030 and disallowance after 2035. By then, Cloudflare reported that more than two thirds of browser traffic to its network used post quantum key agreement

Coming next: 2027 and beyond

  • FIPS 206 (FN-DSA, based on FALCON): in NIST's approval chain as of April 2026, date not yet announced
  • HQC standard (planned as FIPS 207): draft expected, final standard expected around 2027
  • 1 January 2027: new acquisitions for US national security systems must comply with CNSA 2.0
  • 2027: Chrome quantum resistant root store and Let's Encrypt production Merkle Tree Certificates targeted
  • December 2027: main obligations of the EU Cyber Resilience Act apply; NIST pilot migration due under EO 14412
  • 2028: UK NCSC discovery and planning milestone
  • 2029: Google and Cloudflare migration targets; early adoption target for Microsoft
  • 2030: EO 14412 key establishment deadline, EU high risk milestone, ASD guidance, NIST deprecation
  • 2031: EO 14412 signature deadline and UK NCSC priority migration milestone
  • 2035: NIST disallowance and the common finish line for the UK, EU, Canada, Japan and NSM-10

What the timeline teaches

The first lesson is how early the work began. Defenders were planning more than twenty years before any quantum computer could threaten real keys. That foresight is why standards, products and policies exist today rather than being rushed into place after a crisis. Few security challenges have been met this calmly

The second lesson is the value of open scrutiny. Rainbow and SIKE were both broken during the competition, by public research, before they reached products. Those breaks strengthened confidence in the survivors. They also showed why diversity and backup algorithms such as HQC make sense

The third lesson is that deadlines have accelerated. For years 2035 was the default horizon. In 2026, major companies and the US government moved key milestones to 2029 to 2031, citing faster than expected progress on the offence. The defence remains ahead, but the margin is narrowing, which is exactly why steady migration matters

Closing thoughts

Viewed as a whole, the defence timeline is one of the most encouraging stories in modern security. Researchers, standards bodies, governments, open source projects and companies have worked together across decades and borders. The world is not finished, especially on signatures and embedded systems, but it is well on the way. Q-Day, whenever it comes, will meet a far better prepared world than it would have a decade ago

Please add milestones I have missed, with dates and sources. Regional milestones from Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East would make this timeline much richer. Let us keep it accurate and up to date together



Key references for citation

  • Shor, 1994; Grover, 1996
  • NSA announcement on transitioning to quantum resistant algorithms, August 2015
  • NIST PQC standardisation process announcements, 2016 to 2022
  • Beullens, Breaking Rainbow Takes a Weekend on a Laptop, 2022; Castryck and Decru, An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH, 2022
  • NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205, 13 August 2024
  • Executive Order 14412, 22 June 2026; NIST IR 8547 final, October 2026
  • Google, cryptography migration timeline, 25 March 2026; IACR ePrint 2026/625
COYB - you know who you are